I. INTRODUCTION
Most evidence to date supports the proposition that shareholders benefit from the actions of hedge fund activists.
1 Nevertheless, hedge fund activism is unpopular in many quarters, particularly among management and directors that become its targets, but also with some similarly-minded opponents in the academy and business. While hedge fund activism's opponents acknowledge (as they must, given the evidence) that activism is on average associated with stock price increases at target firms, 2 they tend (notwithstanding evidence to the contrary) 3 to characterize that average price increase as a short-run effect that merely reflects a , https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers .cfm?abstract_id=2409404 (finding that firms targeted by activist investors generate more patents that are of higher quality relative to a matched sample. Activists push firms to allocate internal innovation to key areas of expertise and inventors at target firms become more productive relative to those at matched firms).higher probability of takeover or stock-popping restructuring events. 4 In turn, they attribute little or no social or long-run value to hedge fund activism.
In addition, some critics of hedge fund activism assert that activism results in decreased investment at target firms and, correspondingly, larger payouts to shareholders. 5 While some have interpreted this as evidence that activism stops wasteful overinvestment, 6 hedge fund activism's opponents-implicitly assuming that most existing corporate investment is both in the interests of shareholders and socially valuable-point to reductions in corporate investment as evidence that hedge fund activism sacrifices long-term corporate and social gains for short-term shareholder returns. 7 Until recently, hedge fund activism's opponents did nothing to target legislation against hedge fund activists, focusing mainly on public debate and requests to the Securities and Exchange Commission-largely ignored to date-for changes in rules that would hinder activist investments. In the words of a leading commentator,
[u]nlike the hostile takeover, activism has precipitated no significant changes in corporate law. Where the hostile takeover triggered structural changes in state corporate codes and the federal securities laws along with a root and branch reconfiguration of fiduciary duty, hedge fund activism largely leaves corporate law where it found it. 8 4 See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 2, at 551. The positive abnormal stock returns on which proponents of hedge fund activism rely do not necessarily demonstrate true gains in efficiency, but may only indicate that the market has given the target firm a higher expected takeover premium; that difference is important because not only may this temporary increase later erode if no takeover results, but in any event it does not demonstrate a true efficiency gain.
Id.
The evidence is to the contrary, however. See, e.g., Nicole M. Boyson, Nickolay Gantchev & Anil Shivdasani, Activism Mergers, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=2677416 (finding that "even when a merger offer is unsuccessful, the offer is associated with an increase in the valuation of the target firm through the implementation of real financial and investment policy changes rather than through revaluation effects."). Id. 5 See, e.g., Bebchuk, et al., supra note 1, at 1137 (identifying activism campaigns that resulted in decreased capital expenditures and research and development and campaigns that resulted in higher payouts to shareholders). 6 See, e.g., id., at 1136 ("Thus, opponents of hedge fund activism overlook that reducing cash holdings and investments might actually move companies closer to, rather than away from, the levels that are optimal for the long term."). Id. 7 Coffee & Palia, supra note 2, at 552 ("[O]ur primary concern is . . . with the possibility that the increasing rate of hedge fund activism is beginning to compel corporate boards and managements to forego long-term investments (particularly in R&D) in favor of a short-term policy of maximizing shareholder payout in the form of dividends and stock buybacks.") Id. That almost changed last year. This Comment explores the first attempt at federal anti-activist legislation, examining both its motivations and its specific legislative goals. On March 17, 2016, United States Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR) introduced the legislation 9 to "increase transparency and strengthen oversight of activist hedge funds."
10 Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) co-sponsored the proposed legislation, 11 which sought to implement four major changes to existing law. First, the legislation would have shortened the disclosure period of Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act for over-5% ownership from ten days to two days.
12 Second, the legislation would have expanded the concept of beneficial ownership to include certain derivatives linked to the value of equity securities. 13 Third, the legislation would have given the Securities and Exchange Commission the right to determine when hedge funds are working together to avoid being characterized as a "group" that must disclose their collective interest in an activist target in the time required under Section 13(d).
14 Fourth, the legislation would have required increased disclosure of short positions in the stock of public companies.
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The legislation went nowhere, but in the late summer of 2017, Senator Baldwin (D-WI) and Senator David Perdue (R-GA) re-introduced the Brokaw Act, bipartisan "legislation to increase transparency and strengthen oversight of predatory activist hedge funds." 16 The re-introduced legislation would decrease the 13(d) period from ten days to four days, 17 up from the earlier proposal. It would "[p]rotect businesses from hedge fund 'wolf packs' by identifying these coordinated groups of hedge funds as a single group to require disclosure," essentially aiming at the same group disclosures as earlier, 18 and it would, as earlier, "[r]equire derivative disclosure to prevent activist investors from profiting by secretly voting against the company's interests." 19 essentially pressuring the two to take positions on executive pay and share buybacks advocated by hedge fund activists. The Brokaw Act, and Senator Baldwin's advocacy and intervention in the appointment of an SEC Commissioner, are stern warnings of policy divorced from evidence. The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate just how poorly supported the Brokaw Act was, given the claims of its supporters.
II. THE PROPOSED BROKAW ACT
The Brokaw Act, according to its sponsors, is named for a small Wisconsin town that went bankrupt after an out-of-state hedge fund closed a paper mill that had provided good jobs to the town for over 100 years. The activist hedge fund bought up the legendary Wausau Paper Company, forced out its executives and demanded short-term returns like buybacks at the expense of the company's long-term future . . . What happened in Wisconsin is one example of a larger problem that demands action.
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The Senators used tough language in attacking hedge fund activists, promising that the Brokaw Act would "help ensure that no other small towns in America will fall victim to activist hedge funds on Wall Street.
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In this section, we first explore what happened in Brokaw, Wisconsin, the offered inspiration for the proposed anti-activist legislation. Contrary to the claim that a hedge fund "forced out" executives and "closed a paper mill," we uncover that it was Wausau's incumbent management that closed the mill. The mill closure occurred during a wide downtrend in the domestic paper industry, and, consistent with those wider industry trends, Wausau Paper Corp. had shuttered other mills long before a hedge fund activist arrived on the scene. Recognizing the tremendous misfortune of the lost jobs and the impact on the Brokaw community, it is inaccurate to lay that outcome at the feet of a hedge fund activist. Instead, to address the root cause of these adverse events requires that one first acknowledge the broader trends in competition, regulation, the shift from printed media to electronic communication, and other factors that have led to the decline of this once successful industry and to the long-term implications for the communities that this industry once supported.
A. Wausau's Previous Mill Closures
A brief review of broad industry trends is helpful. The top panel in Figure 1 provides the total number of employees in the paper and paper products industry over the period 1990-2015. 23 Shaded areas mark National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recessions and the red line marks China's membership in the World Trade Organization. 24 There is a striking decline in the number of employees in this industry. Slightly more than 40% of jobs in the industry were lost over the sample period. Most of the decline took place from the late 1990s through 2010, with a somewhat lower decline thereafter.
It is well known that the United States has been losing manufacturing jobs over the same time period. In an effort to disentangle the decline in employment in the paper and paper products from these broader trends, we provide a simple decomposition of the decline into that driven by overall employment trends in the United States and, more specifically, in manufacturing. The second panel in Fig Importantly, in the third panel we provide the ratio of employment in paper and paper products to that of employment in manufacturing. If the decline in employment in paper and paper products mirrored that in manufacturing, we would expect to see a constant share throughout the twenty-five-year period. Instead, we see a rate of decline in the paper and paper products industry that has been even greater than for manufacturing generally. Paper and paper products comprised about 3.7% of employment in manufacturing in the early 1990s and then showed a persistent decline throughout, reaching about 3% by 2015. 25 Overall, Figure 1 presents a bleak set of data, demonstrating how badly employment has turned down in the U.S. paper and paper products industry even relative to the decline in manufacturing.
The decline in employment can be traced to several economic factors: first, the decline in demand due to substitution away from print paper as a means of communication and advertising to alternative electronic platforms. Second, heightened foreign competition, predominantly from China, that had negative effects on overall manufacturing employment in the United States. 26 Third, increased concern about the environment led to more stringent regulation resulting in costly investments to meet heightened standards to mitigate pollution. Consistent with these declines, the number of pulp and paper mills has been falling for years. 27 The Alliance for American Manufacturing reports on a study from the Center for Paper Business and Industry Studies at Georgia Tech University finding that "since 2000, approximately 126 paper mills in the U.S. have ceased operations and 223,000 well-paid Americans have lost their jobs." 28 The decline of the paper and paper products industry unquestionably has been devastating for jobs and communities. (reporting similar evidence on employment trends in the paper industry and in two sub-sectors: pulp, paper, and paperboard mills and the converted products sector.). "Between 1990 and 2010, employment in the pulp, paper, and paperboard mills sub-sector fell by more than 50%" and " [t] he employment loss in the converted paper products sector was a bit more but the percentage loss was less at 30% over the entire period . . ." Id. Chinese import competition affects local labor markets not just through manufacturing employment, which unsurprisingly is adversely affected, but also along numerous other margins. Import shocks trigger a decline in wages that is primarily observed outside of the manufacturing sector. Reductions in both employment and wage levels lead to a steep drop in the average earnings of households.") Id.
27 Maija Hujala, Heli Arminen, R. Carter Hill & Kaisu Puumalainen, Explaining the Shifts of International Trade in Pulp and Paper Industry, 59 FOREST SCI. 211 (2013) ("In the traditional paper production areas, i.e., North America and Western Europe, paper demand is stagnating or even decreasing, depending on the paper grade, and, as a consequence, the number of pulp and paper machines and mills has declined dramatically in recent years."). Id. Given the long-term decline in the paper and paper products industry, it is no surprise that the Wausau Paper Corp.-the owner of the Brokaw mill-was closing mills for years with no involvement from shareholder activists. In 2005, the company closed its sulfite pulp mill in Brokaw, Wisconsin-the same town that ten years later saw the closure of its paper mill and gave the Brokaw Act its name. The company blamed the 2005 closure on the pulp mill's "high cost of operations and capital investment requirements related to the unit's aging plant and equipment," with the shutdown affecting sixty permanent jobs. 30 In 2007, the company closed its Groveton, New Hampshire mill at a cost of approximately 303 jobs, blaming declining profitability in that mill's division on "secular decline in the demand for" the mill's products "and chronically oversupplied markets in North America," among other things. 31 In December 2008, the company announced the closure of its Appleton, Wisconsin facility, with a cost of ninety jobs. 32 In March 2009, the company announced the closure of its Livermore Falls/Jay, Maine mill, saying that the closure (along with other decisions announced by the company) were "necessary to . . . match capacity with demand during a period of severe economic difficulty."
33 That mill closure cost ninety-six jobs. 34 All these closures took place well before the arrival of a hedge fund activist, Starboard Value, in mid-2011. 
B. The Brokaw Mill Closure
Did "an out-of-state hedge fund close[] a paper mill that had provided good jobs to the town for over 100 years" after "[forcing] out its executives"?
35 A look at the timeline and the public announcements proves the answer is no. Though engaged in some discussions with a hedge fund activist at the time of the Brokaw mill closure, Wausau's existing board of directors and executives remained in full control of the company before and during the decision to close the Brokaw mill in December 2011 and had been considering closure of the Brokaw mill for months and possibly years.
Evidence of the decline in the company's paper segment can be traced to well before the arrival of the activist investor in mid-2011. The company stated in its 2007 annual report that it initiated a profit recovery plan and noted its "determination to address the underperforming portions of [its] business. In [its] most challenging segment, Printing & Writing . . ."-the segment including the Brokaw mill. The report refers to the continued decline over the entire decade in the demand for uncoated free sheet paper resulting in "paper supply [that] has exceeded demand despite the consolidation and capacity rationalization which has occurred across the industry. These factors have led to highly competitive market conditions and eroding industry margins with pricing leverage insufficient to offset the impact of increased manufacturing costs-most notably fiber and energy." This 2010 report is telling for three reasons. First, it reiterates the need to focus on the successful segment of the company-towel and tissue-which, a year later, the hedge fund activist will adopt as the main part of its restructuring efforts. Second, the report objects to the company's claim that the recovery plan has fixed the trouble in the paper segment. Third, the analysts question whether the high executive compensation is set optimally to incentivize management. Six months later, on April 11, 2011, Deutsche Bank followed with an additional report stating: "Despite claims of having 'fixed' these operations 2yrs [sic] ago, the numbers suggest otherwise. Even so, Wausau continues to plow additional capital into the specialty mills." 39 The analysts continue to stress their concern with executive compensation stating that "it's not clear management incentives are aligned with those of shareholders." 40 We plot in Figure 2 the annual total of CEO compensation from 2000 through 2014. 41 The sample reflects the tenure of three CEOs. 42 The first, from 2000-2011, the second from 2012-2013, and the last one for 2014. 43 The level of compensation increases throughout the decade, peaking in 2011, the same year in which the company decided to shut down the Brokaw mill. 44 This pattern is consistent with the analyst's concerns regarding the dysfunctional link between bad firm performance and high executive compensation. 45 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. Executive compensation data is from Execucomp, a subscription-based database. We use their total compensation measure, TDC1, defined as the sum of salary, bonus, other annual, restricted stock grants, LTIP Payouts, all other, and Execucomp's own methodology of estimating the fair value of option grants. 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Id. 47 reporting ownership of 6.3% of the common stock of Wausau. 48 In a letter dated July 28, 2011, the principal of Starboard Value, Jeffrey C. Smith, wrote to Wausau's then-chief executive officer that Wausau was "deeply undervalued," partly as a result of the effect the "dismal performance of the Company's paper business" was having on the company's more successful tissue business. 49 The paper business, Smith argued, was "struggling due to increased commoditization and significant competition 46 Just three days later, the local paper reported a story about the Brokaw mill. "According to an internal Wausau Paper Corp. memo from the vice president to the employees dated July 12, 2011, the Brokaw mill had failed to earn acceptable returns for Wausau since 2002."
Starboard Delivers Letter to CEO and Board of Directors of Wausau
52 "While the Brokaw mill has a proud manufacturing tradition that dates back over 100 years, we are facing an unprecedented perfect storm of rising input costs, declining demand and ever more aggressive competitors," the company management wrote. 53 The company's spokesman, who verified the authenticity of the memo, referred to the Brokaw mill as "our most challenged facility." 54 Wausau later said that it had "been evaluating strategic alternatives for the Paper segment's print and color business[-the part of Wausau's business that included the Brokaw mill-]since the first quarter of 2011 and ha[d] engaged a financial advisor in continuing to evaluate a range of alternatives." 55 All this suggests that possible closure of the Brokaw mill had been on the table for months, if not years, before the arrival of the activist.
The clearest indication of Starboard Value's assessment regarding the future of the Brokaw mill-an assessment that advocated a sale, not closure-was made public in a letter sent on October 3, 2011 to the CEO and board of directors of the company:
[W]e believe the Board must be proactive and hire a financial advisor to immediately explore a sale of this business to one of several larger and better capitalized strategic acquirers. Such potential acquirers would be well positioned to realize substantial synergies by merging the Paper business with their own operations. 56 By December 2011, however, the company had decided not only to shut down the Brokaw mill, but also to exit the print and color paper business entirely, attributing the decision to "dramatic and irreversible market demand decline and 50 Id. 51 the need for consolidation to bring these markets properly into balance. "57 On December 6, 2011, the Wausau board of directors approved a plan to permanently close the Brokaw mill. 58 In doing so, the company eliminated approximately 450 hourly and salaried jobs. 59 There is no evidence that hedge fund activism played any determinative role in the closure of the Brokaw mill. 60 Then, where did the story come from? Years after the closure, Wausau's chief executive officer claimed that Wausau had a buyer lined up for the Brokaw mill, but that Starboard Value's public criticism of the paper business caused the potential buyer to lower its price to an "unacceptable" level around the same time that the mill lost a major customer. 61 He did not disclose the "unacceptable" terms, but it is difficult to believe that Starboard Value's criticism of the paper industry could have influenced a potential mill buyer, where those criticisms reflected well-known and overwhelming industry trends. 62 More likely, the story reflects after-the-fact scapegoating, a story that-while apparently false-motivates legislation proposed in the United States Senate. 
III. TWO QUESTIONABLE CLAIMS ABOUT HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM
We now consider two claims inherent in the Brokaw Act. The first-that hedge fund activists typically use the ten-day disclosure period of Rule 13(d)-(1) to accumulate positions significantly in excess of 5%-has been the subject of empirical study and has been disproven. 64 The second-that hedge fund activists often form a "wolf pack" in the pre-disclosure period to act collectively against a target-is also without empirical support. The Brokaw Act would have shortened the disclosure period of Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act for 5% ownership to two days. 66 Currently, Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 13(d)-1(a) require that any beneficial owner of more than 5% of a class of registered equity securities must file Schedule 13D within ten days after passing the 5% threshold.
67 Schedule 13D discloses the identity of the beneficial owner, the funding source for the purchases, the investment purposes, the number of shares, and other information. 68 Some commentators have argued that trading volume in advance of Schedule 13D disclosures is so high that it must reflect wolf pack formation. Professors Coffee and Palia examine a chart showing an increase in abnormal volume and conclude that the high volume of trading that is evident . . . on the last eight days preceding the Schedule 13D's filing is attributable to others, who most likely have been informed by those filing the Schedule 13D of their intentions. The inference then seems obvious: tipping and informed trading appears to characterize both the formation of the 'wolf pack' and transactions during the window period preceding the filing of the Schedule 13D. 69 is 'concentrated on the day they cross the threshold as well as the following day.'" 70 They then assume, without evidence, that the day of and day after the threshold is crossed are days t-10 and t-9 from the filing date so that, in their reasoning, the observed abnormal volume apparent from days t-8 to the filing date of the Schedule 13D "is attributable to others" than the hedge fund activist. 71 They then claim that those "others . . . most likely have been informed by those filing the Schedule 13D of their intentions."
72 They assert, "[t]hus, much of the buying during the ten-day window seems likely to be by other wolf pack members." The problem is that it is factually incorrect to assume that hedge fund activists cross the 5% threshold on days t-10 and t-9, such that the trading in the remaining eight days is by others. Hedge fund activists often file Schedule 13Ds well before the ten-day window closes. The histogram in Figure 4 , reproduced from prior work, 74 shows that many hedge fund activists file before the ten-day window closes with a large number of filings in the days before day ten. 70 Coffee and Palia, supra note 2, at 565 (quoting Bebchuk, et al., supra note 1, at 6). 71 Id. at 565. 72 Id. 73 Id. If Professors Coffee and Palia want to determine the level of abnormal volume following the date that the activist crosses the 5% threshold, they must center data on the date the reporting threshold was crossed rather than the date that the Schedule 13D was filed. When we do so, the anomalous pattern of abnormal volume disappears; volume spikes on the day the activist crosses, with much smaller levels of abnormal volume before that date, as reflected in Figure 5 , a reproduced chart from an earlier study: Figures 4 and 5 show that (i) there is a large variation in the number of days that activists take in order to publicly file and (ii) that the exceptional trading volume, if any, occurs on the day the activist crosses the 5% threshold. If one erroneously assumes that activists always take ten days until filing, then an event study centered on the filing date (rather than the cross date) would lead one to the mistaken conclusion (such as that by Coffee and Palia) that abnormal trading took place several days after the crossing.
Note that the data does not eliminate the possibility of some tipping or wolf pack formation after the crossing of the 5% threshold, but as Figure 5 illustrates, the number of additional shares purchased by the elusive pack is economically small and is nowhere near the range suggested by Coffee and Palia unless much of the trading on the trigger date is by investors forming a wolf pack. It is also likely that an important part of the trading on the threshold day is by investors other than the hedge fund activist. Such trading can arise either because of leaked information about the activist's intent to cross the 5% threshold or because activists choose to trade precisely when they anticipate or observe uninformed selling. While leakage of information is possible, we are not aware of any direct empirical evidence supporting such a large-scale sharing of information. This is especially important since similar patterns of abnormal volume-with a spike at the threshold crossing date-appear for non-activist Schedule 13D filers as well where no plausible "wolf pack" theory exists. 76 Second, trading by hedge fund activists is not independent of abnormal volume. Research shows that hedge fund activists trade more-i.e., build their positions-when liquidity (i.e., volume) is higher. 77 That is, the high turnover is what one should expect to see if Schedule 13D filers, whether activists or not, choose to trade. 78 There simply is no basis to assume that trading by non-activists is trading by members of a wolf pack.
IV. TWO OTHER BROKAW ACT PROPOSALS AND THE MYTHS BEHIND THEM
We now consider two additional parts of the proposed Brokaw Act. The first would have expanded the concept of beneficial ownership to include certain derivatives linked to the value of equity securities. The second would have required increased disclosure of short positions in the stock of public companies. Neither activity plays any important role in hedge fund activism.
A. Expanding the Definition of Beneficial Ownership
The Brokaw Act would have expanded the concept of beneficial ownership to include derivatives linked to the value of equity securities that currently do not have to be reported. 79 Under existing rules, beneficial ownership occurs when a person, directly or indirectly, has the power (or the right to acquire such power) to vote or dispose of an equity security. The real target of the Brokaw Act is cashsettled swaps. Cash-settled swaps that reference common stock give their "long" counterparty the right to receive the value of any increase in the price of the underlying shares plus the value of any cash distributions, like dividends. 80 Cash-exiting in a timely and efficient fashion. Instead, many corporations continue to invest in businesses that cannot be expected to deliver adequate returns on new investment, while others use good cash flow from existing businesses to "diversify" into new lines, rather than returning those funds to shareholders and letting shareholders invest in new businesses on their own. Not surprisingly, some hedge fund activism is aimed at stopping value-destroying decisions of this type or reversing such decisions that were made in the past. This puts hedge fund activists-and the shareholders who support them-at odds with those constituencies we mentioned above who benefit from those decisions. And there is no question that what is in the interests of shareholders is often painful for non-shareholders. There is an undeniable human cost to capitalism's "creative destruction"-the term coined by economist Joseph Schumpeter in his classic Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
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-including the pain of unemployment and the psychic sting of perceived failure. There are good reasons to believe that a vibrant capitalist system that facilitates exit and encourages reinvestment is the best form of economic system available in the sense that it is the best way to ensure the maximum amount of wealth in a society. But that is cold comfort to a dislocated worker, an officer or director whose business judgment is no longer bearing fruit, or a community ravaged by the close of its largest employer. Part of understanding hedge fund activism is understanding the real conflict that exists between shareholders and non-shareholders. But that is no excuse for misrepresentations in the law-making process.
